

DRAFT

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1 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Delivery of Weapons from Cuba to Various Latin American
Insurgent Groups Alleged

1. This memorandum is to attempt to put into context the current rash of reports alleging^{de} the delivery from Cuba of significant quantities of weapons to various Latin insurgent groups under either Soviet or Cuban direction. This staff believes that all such reports thus far received are probably false and that they will probably continue to be false.

2. Insurgent groups do not require bulk logistic support. Insurgent groups in theory and in practice procure weapons locally through either commercial channels or, more usually, from the forces of the government which they oppose. This has been true in Laos, in Vietnam, in Colombia, in Algeria, in Ireland and almost anywhere else in the world. It was largely true in the American Revolution and in the Indian Wars. The reasons are simple in the extreme-- it is a cheap, effective, and convenient procedure. This is true enough in a highly developed country. It is even more true in an

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underdeveloped country where explosives are more conveniently
used in construction and in agriculture and where hunting is more
common. The normal procedure is to take the desired weapons,
first from the individual policeman or soldier, and later from
the group of police or soldiers *in the many small outposts*
in the rural areas.

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3. These procedures are explicit in Cuban taught doctrine

and exercises for Latin American guerilla trainees. In Cuba,

(Latin American)

guerilla students are trained with US weapons, ~~except for those~~

~~from Argentina.~~

The Argentine Army was until recently equipped

with German weapons and, consequently, trainees from Argentina

are trained with German made weapons. Cuban published handbooks

for guerilla operations, like those of Southeast Asia emphasis the

Mao thesis of the guerilla being a fish which must live in the

water of the civil populace. Bulk deliveries of munitions from

Bloc countries via whatever intermediaries do not fit into such

a context.

*STATEMENTS BY LATIN AMERICANS WHO
HAD UNDERGOVE GUERRILLA TRAINING IN CUBA AFFIRM THAT THEY ARE TOLD
THAT THEY MUST FORM SELF-SUSTAINING GROUPS IN THEIR COUNTRIES AND*

4. In the entire history of attempting to follow such develop-

ments in the 1950's and 1960's, we are aware of only one reasonably

firm reported of release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400040023-7

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*RELY ON CAPTURED "ENEMY"
WEAPONS*

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^{report} This related to the supplying of timing and fusing devices--

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i.e. time pencils, to saboteurs by the Chinese Communists on the re-entry attempt in the British Cameroons. Please note, in this case only the essential firing device was supplied. The rest of the bomb was supposed to be locally manufactured from commercial dynamite, ammonium nitrate fertilizer and similar, common-use, widely available materials.

5. Various reasons having to do with cover, convenience, cost, availability of materials, resupply problems and security of insurgent activity strongly suggest to this staff that these patterns will prevail. We believe strongly that if outside support is required it would be in terms of grams, e.g. caps for detonating explosives, or a few pounds, e.g. a few machine pistols, a few silencers, or similar devices that could be hard to come by if a local government was to institute effective and efficient control measures of its own channels of distribution of weapons. However, it does not appear that such controls presently exist in very many parts of the world. (c.f. note the recent Washington Post series

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courts.) ^{for} In Venezuela, there ^{are} is documented histories of the 4/
delivery in small quantities of essential components via suit-
cases belonging to Communist members of the legislature who util-
ize their immunity from arrest to perform such movements with
impunity.

6. Reports of deliveries of bulk quantities of weapons to
various Latin American insurgent groups have been edemic for years.
Expectation of more rational rumor mongering at this time are
unrealistic. British Guiana has been, of ^{course} ~~course~~, especially
suspect. These rumors have on several occasions caused the local
British authorities to ^{virtually} take apart several ships. Nothing
has been found ^{nor} is it likely to be.

7. Consequently we believe strongly that the present concern
over the possibility of bulk deliveries to the Latin American insur-
gents is unwarranted and is wasteful of intelligence resources. Such
reports can never be disproven, regardless of the effort devoted
to such an attempt. ^(The rational course seems to be) Recourse to the politically unpopular decision
^{there is some firm evidence of such traffic} to ignore such reports ~~till they can be proven~~ or until the logic of

the ~~same~~ ^{possibility of truth seems to the} ~~rational course.~~

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